workspace: remove worker credential refresh flow
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@@ -16,13 +16,8 @@ The Server control-plane DB contained a current active `worker_workspace_credent
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- A Worker cannot report or ticket the restore regression through the intended typed authority.
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- The failure is easy to misattribute to the Browser multiplexer; in this incident Browser authentication/bootstrap was a separate issue.
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## Suggested investigation
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## Resolution
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Trace the credential lifecycle across Backend restart and Runtime Worker restore:
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The per-Worker bearer credential was removed rather than adding restore-time secret rotation and reinjection. Worker Workspace requests now carry the Runtime/Worker identity binding established by Runtime, and Server verifies that identity against the current Runtime catalog before applying Ticket role/assignment gates.
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1. whether Backend rotates or recreates the credential record;
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2. whether restored Worker execution receives the current plaintext credential rather than retaining an old environment/config bundle;
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3. whether credential binding should remain stable across Backend restart or be explicitly refreshed before marking the Worker restored;
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4. whether restore health should include a bounded Workspace API authentication probe.
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Do not treat a current DB credential row alone as proof that the restored Worker possesses it.
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The removal also deletes token mint/rotate/revoke/refresh behavior, live Worker token replacement, and the control-plane credential table. Runtime/Server trust remains the security boundary; Worker role checks remain the accidental-misuse gate.
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