chore(ticket): preserve integrated authentication and WIP test fixes

# Conflicts:
#	crates/workspace-server/src/server_workspace_config_wip_tests.rs

crates/worker-runtime/src/auth.rs

@@ -42,7 +42,11 @@ pub enum RuntimeAuthError {
     #[error("runtime request proof contains an invalid `{0}` claim")]
     InvalidClaim(&'static str),
     #[error("runtime request proof does not match the HTTP request")]
-    ClaimMismatch,
+    ClaimMismatch(RuntimeRequestClaim),
+    #[error("runtime request proof was issued in the future")]
+    RequestIssuedInFuture { iat: i64, exp: i64, now: i64 },
+    #[error("runtime request proof has expired")]
+    RequestExpired { iat: i64, exp: i64, now: i64 },
     #[error("unknown token issuer `{0}`")]
     UnknownIssuer(String),
     #[error("invalid token signature")]
@@ -171,6 +175,19 @@ pub struct RuntimeAuthContext {
     pub expires_at: u64,
 }
 
+/// The first mismatching signed claim, in verification order. No input values.
+#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
+pub enum RuntimeRequestClaim {
+    Issuer,
+    Audience,
+    Workspace,
+    Worker,
+    Permission,
+    Method,
+    Path,
+    BodyDigest,
+}
+
 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
 pub struct RuntimeRequestSourceClaims {
     pub iss: String,
@@ -293,19 +310,54 @@ pub fn verify_runtime_request_source(
         public_key,
     )?;
     let claims = signed.claims;
-    if claims.iss != expected.identity_id
+    for (matches, claim) in [
-        || claims.aud != expected.audience
+        (
-        || claims.workspace_id != expected.workspace_id
+            claims.iss == expected.identity_id,
-        || claims.worker_id.as_deref() != expected.worker_id
+            RuntimeRequestClaim::Issuer,
-        || claims.permission != expected.permission
+        ),
-        || claims.method != expected.method
+        (
-        || claims.path != expected.path
+            claims.aud == expected.audience,
-        || claims.body_digest != expected.body_digest
+            RuntimeRequestClaim::Audience,
-    {
+        ),
-        return Err(RuntimeAuthError::ClaimMismatch);
+        (
+            claims.workspace_id == expected.workspace_id,
+            RuntimeRequestClaim::Workspace,
+        ),
+        (
+            claims.worker_id.as_deref() == expected.worker_id,
+            RuntimeRequestClaim::Worker,
+        ),
+        (
+            claims.permission == expected.permission,
+            RuntimeRequestClaim::Permission,
+        ),
+        (
+            claims.method == expected.method,
+            RuntimeRequestClaim::Method,
+        ),
+        (claims.path == expected.path, RuntimeRequestClaim::Path),
+        (
+            claims.body_digest == expected.body_digest,
+            RuntimeRequestClaim::BodyDigest,
+        ),
+    ] {
+        if !matches {
+            return Err(RuntimeAuthError::ClaimMismatch(claim));
         }
-    if claims.iat > expected.now_unix || claims.exp < expected.now_unix {
+    }
-        return Err(RuntimeAuthError::Expired);
+    if claims.iat > expected.now_unix {
+        return Err(RuntimeAuthError::RequestIssuedInFuture {
+            iat: claims.iat,
+            exp: claims.exp,
+            now: expected.now_unix,
+        });
+    }
+    if claims.exp < expected.now_unix {
+        return Err(RuntimeAuthError::RequestExpired {
+            iat: claims.iat,
+            exp: claims.exp,
+            now: expected.now_unix,
+        });
     }
     Ok(claims)
 }
@@ -705,7 +757,9 @@ mod tests {
         };
         assert!(matches!(
             verify_runtime_request_source(&proof, &trusted.public_key, &changed_body),
-            Err(RuntimeAuthError::ClaimMismatch)
+            Err(RuntimeAuthError::ClaimMismatch(
+                RuntimeRequestClaim::BodyDigest
+            ))
         ));
         let spoofed = RuntimeIdentityMaterial::generate("runtime-main").unwrap();
         assert!(matches!(
@@ -714,6 +768,183 @@ mod tests {
         ));
     }
 
+    #[test]
+    fn runtime_request_proof_preserves_inclusive_time_bounds_and_reports_exact_rejections() {
+        let runtime = RuntimeIdentityMaterial::generate("runtime-main").unwrap();
+        let signer = RuntimeRequestSourceSigner::from_identity(&runtime);
+        let proof = signer
+            .issue(
+                "server",
+                "workspace",
+                None,
+                "permission",
+                "POST",
+                "/request",
+                b"{}",
+                90,
+                10,
+            )
+            .unwrap();
+        let digest = request_body_digest(b"{}");
+        let expected = RuntimeRequestSourceExpectation {
+            identity_id: "runtime-main",
+            audience: "server",
+            workspace_id: "workspace",
+            worker_id: None,
+            permission: "permission",
+            method: "POST",
+            path: "/request",
+            body_digest: &digest,
+            now_unix: 90,
+        };
+        for now in [90, 99, 100] {
+            assert!(
+                verify_runtime_request_source(
+                    &proof,
+                    &runtime.public_key,
+                    &RuntimeRequestSourceExpectation {
+                        now_unix: now,
+                        ..expected.clone()
+                    }
+                )
+                .is_ok()
+            );
+        }
+        for (now, future) in [(89, true), (101, false)] {
+            let error = verify_runtime_request_source(
+                &proof,
+                &runtime.public_key,
+                &RuntimeRequestSourceExpectation {
+                    now_unix: now,
+                    ..expected.clone()
+                },
+            )
+            .unwrap_err();
+            match error {
+                RuntimeAuthError::RequestIssuedInFuture {
+                    iat,
+                    exp,
+                    now: verified,
+                } if future => assert_eq!((iat, exp, verified), (90, 100, now)),
+                RuntimeAuthError::RequestExpired {
+                    iat,
+                    exp,
+                    now: verified,
+                } if !future => assert_eq!((iat, exp, verified), (90, 100, now)),
+                other => panic!("unexpected rejection: {other:?}"),
+            }
+        }
+        for (claim, expectation) in [
+            (
+                RuntimeRequestClaim::Issuer,
+                RuntimeRequestSourceExpectation {
+                    identity_id: "other",
+                    ..expected.clone()
+                },
+            ),
+            (
+                RuntimeRequestClaim::Audience,
+                RuntimeRequestSourceExpectation {
+                    audience: "other",
+                    ..expected.clone()
+                },
+            ),
+            (
+                RuntimeRequestClaim::Workspace,
+                RuntimeRequestSourceExpectation {
+                    workspace_id: "other",
+                    ..expected.clone()
+                },
+            ),
+            (
+                RuntimeRequestClaim::Worker,
+                RuntimeRequestSourceExpectation {
+                    worker_id: Some("other"),
+                    ..expected.clone()
+                },
+            ),
+            (
+                RuntimeRequestClaim::Permission,
+                RuntimeRequestSourceExpectation {
+                    permission: "other",
+                    ..expected.clone()
+                },
+            ),
+            (
+                RuntimeRequestClaim::Method,
+                RuntimeRequestSourceExpectation {
+                    method: "GET",
+                    ..expected.clone()
+                },
+            ),
+            (
+                RuntimeRequestClaim::Path,
+                RuntimeRequestSourceExpectation {
+                    path: "/other",
+                    ..expected.clone()
+                },
+            ),
+            (
+                RuntimeRequestClaim::BodyDigest,
+                RuntimeRequestSourceExpectation {
+                    body_digest: "other",
+                    ..expected.clone()
+                },
+            ),
+        ] {
+            assert!(
+                matches!(verify_runtime_request_source(&proof, &runtime.public_key, &expectation), Err(RuntimeAuthError::ClaimMismatch(actual)) if actual == claim)
+            );
+        }
+        assert!(matches!(
+            verify_runtime_request_source(
+                &proof,
+                &runtime.public_key,
+                &RuntimeRequestSourceExpectation {
+                    audience: "other",
+                    now_unix: 101,
+                    ..expected.clone()
+                }
+            ),
+            Err(RuntimeAuthError::ClaimMismatch(
+                RuntimeRequestClaim::Audience
+            ))
+        ));
+        let spoofed = RuntimeIdentityMaterial::generate("runtime-main").unwrap();
+        assert!(matches!(
+            verify_runtime_request_source(
+                &proof,
+                &spoofed.public_key,
+                &RuntimeRequestSourceExpectation {
+                    now_unix: 101,
+                    ..expected.clone()
+                }
+            ),
+            Err(RuntimeAuthError::InvalidSignature)
+        ));
+        let mut claims = decode_runtime_request_source_claims(&proof).unwrap();
+        claims.iat = 101;
+        claims.exp = 89;
+        let contradictory = sign_json_token(
+            RUNTIME_REQUEST_SOURCE_PROOF_PREFIX,
+            RUNTIME_REQUEST_SOURCE_SIGNING_INPUT_PREFIX,
+            &runtime.signing_key().unwrap(),
+            &claims,
+        )
+        .unwrap();
+        assert!(matches!(
+            verify_runtime_request_source(
+                &contradictory,
+                &runtime.public_key,
+                &RuntimeRequestSourceExpectation {
+                    now_unix: 100,
+                    ..expected.clone()
+                }
+            ),
+            Err(RuntimeAuthError::RequestIssuedInFuture { .. })
+        ));
+    }
+
     #[test]
     fn runtime_request_source_proof_rejects_wrong_scope_and_expiry() {
         let runtime = RuntimeIdentityMaterial::generate("runtime-main").unwrap();
@@ -749,7 +980,9 @@ mod tests {
         };
         assert!(matches!(
             verify_runtime_request_source(&proof, &runtime.public_key, &wrong_workspace),
-            Err(RuntimeAuthError::ClaimMismatch)
+            Err(RuntimeAuthError::ClaimMismatch(
+                RuntimeRequestClaim::Workspace
+            ))
         ));
         let expired = RuntimeRequestSourceExpectation {
             now_unix: 101,
@@ -757,7 +990,11 @@ mod tests {
         };
         assert!(matches!(
             verify_runtime_request_source(&proof, &runtime.public_key, &expired),
-            Err(RuntimeAuthError::Expired)
+            Err(RuntimeAuthError::RequestExpired {
+                iat: 90,
+                exp: 100,
+                now: 101
+            })
         ));
     }
 }

crates/workspace-server/src/server.rs

@@ -2632,34 +2632,30 @@ fn runtime_request_proof_rejection(
     method: &str,
     path: &str,
     workspace_id: &str,
-    error: &crate::worker_source::WorkerMutationSourceProofError,
+    error: &crate::worker_source::RuntimeRequestProofError,
 ) -> Response {
-    use crate::worker_source::WorkerMutationSourceProofError;
+    // Never format an error or raw claims. IDs are fixed-length fingerprints;
-
+    // verification labels describe proof-check progress, not authorization.
-    // Do not format the error itself: Authority and MissingPermission can carry
-    // internal or request-derived strings. Only emit allowlisted reason codes.
-    let reason = match error {
-        WorkerMutationSourceProofError::Missing => "missing",
-        WorkerMutationSourceProofError::Invalid => "invalid",
-        WorkerMutationSourceProofError::WrongAudience => "wrong_audience",
-        WorkerMutationSourceProofError::WrongWorkspace => "wrong_workspace",
-        WorkerMutationSourceProofError::WrongActor => "wrong_actor",
-        WorkerMutationSourceProofError::MissingPermission(_) => "missing_permission",
-        WorkerMutationSourceProofError::Expired => "expired",
-        WorkerMutationSourceProofError::RevokedRuntimeTrust => "runtime_trust_missing_or_revoked",
-        WorkerMutationSourceProofError::Replay => "replay",
-        WorkerMutationSourceProofError::WorkerCatalogMembership => "worker_catalog_membership",
-        WorkerMutationSourceProofError::Authority(_) => "authority_unavailable",
-    };
     let path = path.split('?').next().unwrap_or(path);
+    let log_path = bounded_auth_log_value(path, 512);
+    let method = bounded_auth_log_value(method, 32);
+    let workspace_id = bounded_auth_log_value(workspace_id, 128);
+    let request_id = uuid::Uuid::now_v7().to_string();
     tracing::warn!(
         target: "yoi::auth",
         event = "runtime_request_proof_rejected",
-        method,
+        method, path = log_path, workspace_id, request_id,
-        path,
-        workspace_id,
         status = 401,
-        reason,
+        reason = error.reason,
+        proof_verification = error.verification,
+        claimed_runtime_id_hash = error.runtime_id_hash.as_deref(),
+        claimed_worker_id_hash = error.worker_id_hash.as_deref(),
+        claimed_token_id_hash = error.token_id_hash.as_deref(),
+        issued_at_unix = error.iat,
+        expires_at_unix = error.exp,
+        verified_at_unix = error.now,
+        time_delta_seconds = error.time_delta_seconds,
+        time_tolerance_seconds = error.time_delta_seconds.map(|_| 0_u64),
         "Runtime request proof rejected",
     );
     repository_api_rejection(
@@ -2669,6 +2665,17 @@ fn runtime_request_proof_rejection(
     )
 }
 
+fn bounded_auth_log_value(value: &str, max_bytes: usize) -> String {
+    let mut result = String::new();
+    for ch in value.chars().filter(|ch| !ch.is_control()) {
+        if result.len() + ch.len_utf8() > max_bytes {
+            break;
+        }
+        result.push(ch);
+    }
+    result
+}
+
 /// Authored configuration editors are user-facing authority, not a generic
 /// Runtime workspace.request capability. Worker configuration access is only
 /// through the grant- and connection-bound WIP adapter. Keep runtime projections
@@ -55527,7 +55534,10 @@ mod tests {
         .await;
         assert!(matches!(
             result,
-            Err(crate::worker_source::WorkerMutationSourceProofError::RevokedRuntimeTrust)
+            Err(crate::worker_source::RuntimeRequestProofError {
+                reason: "runtime_trust_missing_or_revoked",
+                ..
+            })
         ));
     }
 
@@ -55603,7 +55613,10 @@ mod tests {
         .await;
         assert!(matches!(
             result,
-            Err(crate::worker_source::WorkerMutationSourceProofError::WorkerCatalogMembership)
+            Err(crate::worker_source::RuntimeRequestProofError {
+                reason: "worker_catalog_membership",
+                ..
+            })
         ));
     }
 

crates/workspace-server/src/server/tests/auth_logging_tests.rs

@@ -13,62 +13,58 @@ impl Write for CapturedAuthLog {
         self.0.lock().unwrap().extend_from_slice(bytes);
         Ok(bytes.len())
     }
-
     fn flush(&mut self) -> std::io::Result<()> {
         Ok(())
     }
 }
 
-#[test]
+impl CapturedAuthLog {
-fn runtime_proof_diagnostics_redact_error_payloads() {
+    fn subscriber(&self) -> impl tracing::Subscriber + Send + Sync + use<> {
-    use crate::worker_source::WorkerMutationSourceProofError;
+        let writer = self.clone();
-
+        tracing_subscriber::fmt()
-    for (error, reason) in [
+            .with_max_level(tracing::Level::WARN)
-        (
-            WorkerMutationSourceProofError::Authority("private-database-path".to_string()),
-            "authority_unavailable",
-        ),
-        (
-            WorkerMutationSourceProofError::MissingPermission("private-permission".to_string()),
-            "missing_permission",
-        ),
-    ] {
-        let logs = CapturedAuthLog::default();
-        let writer = logs.clone();
-        let subscriber = tracing_subscriber::fmt()
             .without_time()
             .with_ansi(false)
             .json()
             .flatten_event(true)
             .with_writer(move || writer.clone())
-            .finish();
+            .finish()
-        tracing::subscriber::with_default(subscriber, || {
+    }
-            let response = runtime_request_proof_rejection(
+    fn event(&self) -> (Value, String) {
-                "POST",
+        let text = String::from_utf8(self.0.lock().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
-                "/api/w/workspace/workers/self/workdir-session/operations?secret=query-secret",
+        let events: Vec<Value> = text
-                "workspace",
+            .lines()
-                &error,
+            .map(|line| serde_json::from_str::<Value>(line).unwrap())
-            );
+            .filter(|event| event["event"] == "runtime_request_proof_rejected")
-            assert_eq!(response.status(), StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED);
+            .collect();
-        });
+        assert_eq!(
-        let text = String::from_utf8(logs.0.lock().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
+            events.len(),
-        let event: Value = serde_json::from_str(text.trim()).unwrap();
+            1,
-        assert_eq!(event["reason"], reason);
+            "missing or duplicated auth diagnostic: {text}"
-        assert!(!text.contains("private-"), "auth log leaked error details");
-        assert!(
-            !text.contains("query-secret"),
-            "auth log leaked query values"
         );
+        (events[0].clone(), text)
     }
 }
 
 #[tokio::test]
-async fn rejected_runtime_proofs_log_reason_without_request_secrets_on_both_routers() {
+async fn rejected_runtime_proofs_log_reason_and_verification_without_secrets_on_both_routers() {
     let workspace = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
     let mut api = test_api(workspace.path()).await;
     let identity = RuntimeIdentityMaterial::generate("runtime-test").unwrap();
     configure_runtime_request_auth(&mut api, &identity, "runtime-test");
-    let signer = RuntimeRequestSourceSigner::from_identity(&identity);
+    let revoked = RuntimeIdentityMaterial::generate("revoked-runtime-secret").unwrap();
+    configure_runtime_request_auth(&mut api, &revoked, "revoked-runtime-secret");
+    SqliteWorkspaceStore::open(&api.config.database_path)
+        .unwrap()
+        .revoke_workspace_runtime_binding(
+            TEST_WORKSPACE_ID,
+            "revoked-runtime-secret",
+            "2026-10-08T00:00:00Z",
+        )
+        .unwrap();
+    let spoofed = RuntimeIdentityMaterial::generate("runtime-test").unwrap();
+    let unbound_id = "unverified-runtime-secret".repeat(1000);
+    let unbound = RuntimeIdentityMaterial::generate(&unbound_id).unwrap();
     let path = format!("/api/w/{TEST_WORKSPACE_ID}/workers/self/workdir-session/operations");
     let target = format!("{path}?access_token=query-secret");
     let body = "body-secret";
@@ -81,24 +77,94 @@ async fn rejected_runtime_proofs_log_reason_without_request_secrets_on_both_rout
     ];
 
     for app in apps {
-        for reason in ["expired", "replay", "invalid"] {
+        for (case, verification) in [
+            ("expired", "signature_verified"),
+            ("issued_in_future", "signature_verified"),
+            ("replay", "request_verified"),
+            ("invalid_format", "unverified"),
+            ("invalid_encoding", "unverified"),
+            ("malformed_claims", "unverified"),
+            ("invalid_signature", "unverified"),
+            ("tampered_signature", "unverified"),
+            ("revoked_runtime", "unverified"),
+            ("runtime_trust_missing_or_revoked", "unverified"),
+            ("audience_mismatch", "signature_verified"),
+            ("workspace_mismatch", "signature_verified"),
+            ("permission_mismatch", "signature_verified"),
+            ("method_mismatch", "signature_verified"),
+            ("path_mismatch", "signature_verified"),
+            ("body_digest_mismatch", "signature_verified"),
+            ("worker_catalog_membership", "request_verified"),
+        ] {
+            let reason = match case {
+                "tampered_signature" => "invalid_signature",
+                "revoked_runtime" => "runtime_trust_missing_or_revoked",
+                other => other,
+            };
             let now = i64::try_from(worker_runtime::auth::unix_now_seconds()).unwrap();
-            let proof = if reason == "invalid" {
+            let signing_identity = match case {
-                "invalid-proof-secret".to_string()
+                "invalid_signature" => &spoofed,
-            } else {
+                "revoked_runtime" => &revoked,
-                signer
+                "runtime_trust_missing_or_revoked" => &unbound,
+                _ => &identity,
+            };
+            let proof = match reason {
+                "invalid_format" => "invalid-proof-secret".repeat(1000),
+                "invalid_encoding" => "yoi-runtime-request-v1.!.!".to_string(),
+                "malformed_claims" => "yoi-runtime-request-v1.e30.AA".to_string(), // {} claims
+                _ => RuntimeRequestSourceSigner::from_identity(signing_identity)
                     .issue(
-                        "server-test",
+                        if reason == "audience_mismatch" {
-                        TEST_WORKSPACE_ID,
+                            "audience-secret"
-                        None,
+                        } else {
-                        WORKSPACE_REQUEST_PERMISSION,
+                            "server-test"
-                        "POST",
+                        },
-                        &target,
+                        if reason == "workspace_mismatch" {
-                        body.as_bytes(),
+                            "workspace-secret"
-                        if reason == "expired" { now - 120 } else { now },
+                        } else {
-                        30,
+                            TEST_WORKSPACE_ID
+                        },
+                        (reason == "worker_catalog_membership").then_some("worker-secret"),
+                        if reason == "permission_mismatch" {
+                            "permission-secret"
+                        } else {
+                            WORKSPACE_REQUEST_PERMISSION
+                        },
+                        if reason == "method_mismatch" {
+                            "GET"
+                        } else {
+                            "POST"
+                        },
+                        if reason == "path_mismatch" {
+                            "/path-secret"
+                        } else {
+                            &target
+                        },
+                        if reason == "body_digest_mismatch" {
+                            b"different-body-secret"
+                        } else {
+                            body.as_bytes()
+                        },
+                        match reason {
+                            "expired" => i64::MIN,
+                            "issued_in_future" => i64::MAX,
+                            _ => now,
+                        },
+                        if matches!(reason, "expired" | "issued_in_future") {
+                            0
+                        } else {
+                            30
+                        },
                     )
-                    .unwrap()
+                    .unwrap(),
+            };
+            let proof = if case == "tampered_signature" {
+                let (signed, signature) = proof.rsplit_once('.').unwrap();
+                // Flip a significant signature byte, retaining valid base64url.
+                let first = if signature.starts_with('A') { "B" } else { "A" };
+                format!("{signed}.{first}{}", &signature[1..])
+            } else {
+                proof
             };
             if reason == "replay" {
                 crate::worker_source::verify_runtime_request_source_proof(
@@ -114,15 +180,6 @@ async fn rejected_runtime_proofs_log_reason_without_request_secrets_on_both_rout
                 .unwrap();
             }
             let logs = CapturedAuthLog::default();
-            let writer = logs.clone();
-            let subscriber = tracing_subscriber::fmt()
-                .with_max_level(tracing::Level::WARN)
-                .without_time()
-                .with_ansi(false)
-                .json()
-                .flatten_event(true)
-                .with_writer(move || writer.clone())
-                .finish();
             let response = app
                 .clone()
                 .oneshot(
@@ -135,39 +192,206 @@ async fn rejected_runtime_proofs_log_reason_without_request_secrets_on_both_rout
                         .body(Body::from(body))
                         .unwrap(),
                 )
-                .with_subscriber(subscriber)
+                .with_subscriber(logs.subscriber())
                 .await
                 .unwrap();
-            assert_eq!(response.status(), StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED);
+            assert_eq!(response.status(), StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED, "{reason}");
             let response_body = to_bytes(response.into_body(), usize::MAX).await.unwrap();
             assert!(response_body.is_empty(), "{response_body:?}");
-
+            let (event, text) = logs.event();
-            let text = String::from_utf8(logs.0.lock().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
-            let events: Vec<Value> = text
-                .lines()
-                .map(|line| serde_json::from_str::<Value>(line).unwrap())
-                .filter(|event| event["event"] == "runtime_request_proof_rejected")
-                .collect();
-            assert_eq!(
-                events.len(),
-                1,
-                "missing or duplicated auth diagnostic: {text}"
-            );
-            let event = &events[0];
             assert_eq!(event["reason"], reason);
+            assert_eq!(event["proof_verification"], verification);
             assert_eq!(event["status"], 401);
             assert_eq!(event["method"], "POST");
             assert_eq!(event["path"], path);
             assert_eq!(event["workspace_id"], TEST_WORKSPACE_ID);
+            assert!(uuid::Uuid::parse_str(event["request_id"].as_str().unwrap()).is_ok());
+            if verification == "unverified"
+                && matches!(
+                    reason,
+                    "invalid_format" | "invalid_encoding" | "malformed_claims"
+                )
+            {
+                assert!(event.get("claimed_runtime_id_hash").is_none());
+                assert!(event.get("claimed_token_id_hash").is_none());
+            } else {
+                let claims =
+                    worker_runtime::auth::decode_runtime_request_source_claims(&proof).unwrap();
+                assert_eq!(
+                    event["claimed_runtime_id_hash"],
+                    crate::worker_source::diagnostic_id_hash(&claims.iss)
+                );
+                assert_eq!(
+                    event["claimed_token_id_hash"],
+                    crate::worker_source::diagnostic_id_hash(&claims.jti)
+                );
+                if let Some(worker) = &claims.worker_id {
+                    assert_eq!(
+                        event["claimed_worker_id_hash"],
+                        crate::worker_source::diagnostic_id_hash(worker)
+                    );
+                }
+            }
+            if matches!(reason, "expired" | "issued_in_future") {
+                let bound = if reason == "expired" {
+                    i64::MIN
+                } else {
+                    i64::MAX
+                };
+                assert_eq!(event["issued_at_unix"], bound);
+                assert_eq!(event["expires_at_unix"], bound);
+                let verified = event["verified_at_unix"].as_i64().unwrap();
+                assert_eq!(
+                    event["time_delta_seconds"].as_u64(),
+                    Some(bound.abs_diff(verified))
+                );
+                assert_eq!(event["time_tolerance_seconds"], 0);
+            } else {
+                assert!(event.get("time_delta_seconds").is_none());
+                assert!(event.get("issued_at_unix").is_none());
+            }
             for secret in [
                 &proof,
+                &identity.private_key,
+                &spoofed.private_key,
+                &unbound_id,
                 "access_token",
                 "query-secret",
                 body,
                 "bearer-secret",
+                "audience-secret",
+                "workspace-secret",
+                "permission-secret",
+                "path-secret",
+                "worker-secret",
+                "revoked-runtime-secret",
+                &revoked.private_key,
             ] {
-                assert!(!text.contains(secret), "auth log leaked request data");
+                assert!(
+                    !text.contains(secret),
+                    "auth log leaked request data: {reason}"
+                );
+            }
+            assert!(text.len() < 2200, "unbounded diagnostic: {}", text.len());
         }
     }
 }
+
+#[tokio::test]
+async fn runtime_proof_setup_failure_logs_no_internal_error_and_bounds_request_metadata() {
+    let workspace = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
+    let mut api = test_api(workspace.path()).await;
+    let identity = RuntimeIdentityMaterial::generate("runtime-test").unwrap();
+    configure_runtime_request_auth(&mut api, &identity, "runtime-test");
+    api.config.backend_base_url = None;
+    let proof = RuntimeRequestSourceSigner::from_identity(&identity)
+        .issue(
+            "server-test",
+            TEST_WORKSPACE_ID,
+            None,
+            WORKSPACE_REQUEST_PERMISSION,
+            "POST",
+            "/request",
+            b"{}",
+            90,
+            10,
+        )
+        .unwrap();
+    let error = crate::worker_source::verify_runtime_request_source_proof(
+        &api,
+        &proof,
+        "private-workspace-secret",
+        WORKSPACE_REQUEST_PERMISSION,
+        "POST",
+        "/request",
+        "digest",
+    )
+    .await
+    .unwrap_err();
+    let logs = CapturedAuthLog::default();
+    let long_path = format!("/{}?secret=query-secret", "é\n".repeat(1000));
+    let response = tracing::subscriber::with_default(logs.subscriber(), || {
+        runtime_request_proof_rejection(
+            &"M\n".repeat(1000),
+            &long_path,
+            &"w\n".repeat(1000),
+            &error,
+        )
+    });
+    assert_eq!(response.status(), StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED);
+    assert!(
+        to_bytes(response.into_body(), usize::MAX)
+            .await
+            .unwrap()
+            .is_empty()
+    );
+    let (event, text) = logs.event();
+    assert_eq!(event["reason"], "backend_audience_unavailable");
+    assert_eq!(event["proof_verification"], "unverified");
+    for (field, limit) in [("method", 32), ("path", 512), ("workspace_id", 128)] {
+        let value = event[field].as_str().unwrap();
+        assert!(value.len() <= limit);
+        assert!(!value.chars().any(char::is_control));
+    }
+    for secret in [&proof, "private-workspace-secret", "query-secret"] {
+        assert!(!text.contains(secret));
+    }
+}
+
+#[tokio::test]
+async fn repository_runtime_proof_401_keeps_generic_envelope_on_both_routers() {
+    let workspace = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
+    let mut api = test_api(workspace.path()).await;
+    let identity = RuntimeIdentityMaterial::generate("runtime-test").unwrap();
+    configure_runtime_request_auth(&mut api, &identity, "runtime-test");
+    let path = format!("/api/w/{TEST_WORKSPACE_ID}/repositories");
+    for app in [
+        build_router(api.clone()),
+        workspace_server_router(WorkspaceServerApi::new(
+            api.config.clone(),
+            api.store.clone(),
+        )),
+    ] {
+        for issued_at in [i64::MIN, i64::MAX] {
+            let proof = RuntimeRequestSourceSigner::from_identity(&identity)
+                .issue(
+                    "server-test",
+                    TEST_WORKSPACE_ID,
+                    None,
+                    WORKSPACE_REQUEST_PERMISSION,
+                    "GET",
+                    &path,
+                    b"",
+                    issued_at,
+                    0,
+                )
+                .unwrap();
+            let response = app
+                .clone()
+                .oneshot(
+                    Request::builder()
+                        .method(Method::GET)
+                        .uri(&path)
+                        .header(RUNTIME_REQUEST_SOURCE_PROOF_HEADER, &proof)
+                        .body(Body::empty())
+                        .unwrap(),
+                )
+                .await
+                .unwrap();
+            assert_eq!(response.status(), StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED);
+            let body = to_bytes(response.into_body(), usize::MAX).await.unwrap();
+            let actual: Value = serde_json::from_slice(&body).unwrap();
+            let expected = serde_json::to_value(server_api::RepositoryApiError::new(
+                401,
+                "Unauthorized",
+                "invalid runtime request proof",
+                Vec::new(),
+            ))
+            .unwrap();
+            assert_eq!(
+                actual, expected,
+                "auth internals must not expand the external envelope"
+            );
+        }
+    }
 }

crates/workspace-server/src/server_workspace_config_wip_tests.rs

@@ -139,26 +139,33 @@ impl worker::WorkspaceClient for ConfigRouterClient {
         Ok(response)
     }
 }
-fn config_interface(path: &str) -> wip_protocol::InterfaceReference {
+fn config_interface(path: &str) -> Value {
-    // Use the published structured Interface identity, not a model-managed validator.
+    // Exact contextual reference published by the current config Object.
-    wip_protocol::InterfaceReference {
+    json!({"scope": path, "name": "yoi.workspace-config/node/v1"})
-        scope: path.into(),
-        name: "yoi.workspace-config/node/v1".into(),
 }
+async fn config_discover(runtime: &worker::wip::WipRuntime, path: &str) {
+    inspect_published_interface(runtime, path, &config_interface(path)).await;
 }
-async fn config_inspect(runtime: &worker::wip::WipRuntime, path: &str) {
+async fn inspect_published_interface(
-    let output = runtime.inspect(path.into(), true).await.unwrap();
+    runtime: &worker::wip::WipRuntime,
-    let observed: Value = serde_json::from_str(output.content.as_deref().unwrap()).unwrap();
+    path: &str,
+    expected: &Value,
+) {
+    let tree = runtime.tree(path.into(), 0, true).await.unwrap();
+    let tree: Value = serde_json::from_str(tree.content.as_deref().unwrap()).unwrap();
+    assert_eq!(
+        tree["path"], path,
+        "Object must come from live Tree: {tree}"
+    );
+    let inspected = runtime.inspect(path.into(), true).await.unwrap();
+    let inspected: Value = serde_json::from_str(inspected.content.as_deref().unwrap()).unwrap();
     assert!(
-        observed["interfaces"]
+        inspected["interfaces"]
             .as_array()
             .unwrap()
             .iter()
-            .any(|interface| {
+            .any(|interface| &interface["reference"] == expected),
-                interface["reference"]
+        "interface must come from live path-centered Inspect: {inspected}"
-                    == json!({"scope": path, "name": config_interface(path).name})
-            }),
-        "Interface must come from live Object inspection: {observed}"
     );
 }
 async fn config_call(
@@ -170,7 +177,10 @@ async fn config_call(
     runtime
         .invoke(
             path.into(),
-            config_interface(path),
+            wip_protocol::InterfaceReference {
+                scope: path.into(),
+                name: "yoi.workspace-config/node/v1".into(),
+            },
             operation.into(),
             args,
             agen::tool::ToolExecutionContext::direct(),
@@ -184,17 +194,9 @@ async fn catalog_call(
     base: &str,
     operation: &str,
 ) -> Value {
-    let interface = json!({"scope": path, "name": base});
+    // Live catalog publication contextualizes the Interface to this Object.
-    let inspected = runtime.inspect(path.into(), true).await.unwrap();
+    let reference = json!({"scope": path, "name": base});
-    let observed: Value = serde_json::from_str(inspected.content.as_deref().unwrap()).unwrap();
+    inspect_published_interface(runtime, path, &reference).await;
-    assert!(
-        observed["interfaces"]
-            .as_array()
-            .unwrap()
-            .iter()
-            .any(|published| published["reference"] == interface),
-        "{observed}"
-    );
     let output = runtime
         .invoke(
             path.into(),
@@ -380,7 +382,7 @@ async fn workspace_config_real_selected_invoke_backend_wip_edit_create_delete_im
             .connection_id,
         attached.connection_id
     );
-    config_inspect(&wip, CONTENT_ROOT).await;
+    config_discover(&wip, CONTENT_ROOT).await;
     config_call(
         &wip,
         CONTENT_ROOT,
@@ -390,7 +392,7 @@ async fn workspace_config_real_selected_invoke_backend_wip_edit_create_delete_im
     .await
     .unwrap();
     let path = "/workspace-config/notes/wip.md";
-    config_inspect(&wip, path).await;
+    config_discover(&wip, path).await;
     assert!(
         config_call(&wip, path, "read", json!({}))
             .await
@@ -424,7 +426,7 @@ async fn workspace_config_real_selected_invoke_backend_wip_edit_create_delete_im
     config_call(&wip, path, "write", json!({"content":"replacement note"}))
         .await
         .unwrap();
-    config_inspect(&wip, CONTENT_ROOT).await;
+    config_discover(&wip, CONTENT_ROOT).await;
     config_call(&wip,CONTENT_ROOT,"apply_changes",json!({"changes":[
         {"kind":"create","path":"fragments/prompts.dcdl","content_type":"decodal","content":"{ common = { language = \"CONFIG_WIP_E2E\"; }; }"},
         {"kind":"update","path":"main.dcdl","content":"{ prompts = import \"./fragments/prompts.dcdl\"; } as WorkspaceConfigSchema"}
@@ -438,7 +440,7 @@ async fn workspace_config_real_selected_invoke_backend_wip_edit_create_delete_im
         .unwrap();
     let prompts = crate::prompt_settings::project_prompts_from_workspace_config(&state).unwrap();
     assert_eq!(prompts.templates["common.language"], "CONFIG_WIP_E2E");
-    config_inspect(&wip, path).await;
+    config_discover(&wip, path).await;
     config_call(&wip, path, "delete", json!({})).await.unwrap();
     assert!(
         fixture
@@ -451,7 +453,7 @@ async fn workspace_config_real_selected_invoke_backend_wip_edit_create_delete_im
             .get(&config_source::VirtualPath::parse("notes/wip.md").unwrap())
             .is_none()
     );
-    config_inspect(&wip, CONTENT_ROOT).await;
+    config_discover(&wip, CONTENT_ROOT).await;
     let before = fixture
         .api
         .config_store
@@ -494,7 +496,7 @@ async fn workspace_config_real_selected_invoke_backend_wip_edit_create_delete_im
         dispatched + 1,
         "a lost response cannot trigger automatic retry"
     );
-    config_inspect(&wip, CONTENT_ROOT).await;
+    config_discover(&wip, CONTENT_ROOT).await;
     let readonly = workspace_config::attach(
         &fixture.api,
         &fixture.worker,
@@ -635,7 +637,7 @@ async fn assert_config_production_http_adapter(
     )
     .unwrap();
     assert_config_catalog(&wip, &attached).await;
-    config_inspect(&wip, "/workspace-config/main.dcdl").await;
+    config_discover(&wip, "/workspace-config/main.dcdl").await;
     let main_interface = wip
         .inspect("/workspace-config/main.dcdl".into(), true)
         .await
@@ -654,7 +656,7 @@ async fn assert_config_production_http_adapter(
             .unwrap()
             .contains("WorkspaceConfigSchema")
     );
-    config_inspect(&wip, "/workspace-config").await;
+    config_discover(&wip, "/workspace-config").await;
     config_call(
         &wip,
         "/workspace-config",

crates/workspace-server/src/worker_source.rs

@@ -3,120 +3,19 @@ use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
 
 use axum::http::HeaderMap;
 use worker_runtime::auth::{
-    RuntimeRequestSourceExpectation, WorkerMutationActorKind, WorkerMutationOperation,
+    WorkerMutationActorKind, WorkerMutationOperation, WorkerMutationSourceClaims,
-    WorkerMutationSourceClaims, WorkerMutationSourceExpectation,
+    WorkerMutationSourceExpectation, decode_worker_mutation_source_claims,
-    decode_runtime_request_source_claims, decode_worker_mutation_source_claims,
+    verify_worker_mutation_source_proof,
-    verify_runtime_request_source, verify_worker_mutation_source_proof,
 };
 use worker_runtime::worker_source::InProcessWorkerMutationProof;
 
 use crate::server::{ServerConfig, WorkspaceApi};
-use crate::store::ControlPlaneStore;
 
-#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
+mod runtime_request;
-pub struct VerifiedRuntimeRequestSource {
+pub use runtime_request::{
-    pub runtime_id: String,
+    RuntimeRequestProofError, VerifiedRuntimeRequestSource, diagnostic_id_hash,
-    pub worker_id: Option<String>,
+    verify_runtime_request_source_proof, verify_runtime_request_source_proof_with_store,
-}
-
-pub async fn verify_runtime_request_source_proof(
-    api: &WorkspaceApi,
-    proof: &str,
-    workspace_id: &str,
-    permission: &str,
-    method: &str,
-    path: &str,
-    body_digest: &str,
-) -> Result<VerifiedRuntimeRequestSource, WorkerMutationSourceProofError> {
-    verify_runtime_request_source_proof_with_store(
-        api.store.as_ref(),
-        &api.config,
-        proof,
-        workspace_id,
-        permission,
-        method,
-        path,
-        body_digest,
-    )
-    .await
-}
-
-#[allow(clippy::too_many_arguments)]
-pub async fn verify_runtime_request_source_proof_with_store(
-    store: &dyn ControlPlaneStore,
-    config: &ServerConfig,
-    proof: &str,
-    workspace_id: &str,
-    permission: &str,
-    method: &str,
-    path: &str,
-    body_digest: &str,
-) -> Result<VerifiedRuntimeRequestSource, WorkerMutationSourceProofError> {
-    let unverified = decode_runtime_request_source_claims(proof)
-        .map_err(|_| WorkerMutationSourceProofError::Invalid)?;
-    let audience = remote_audience(config, workspace_id)?;
-    let trusted = store
-        .get_workspace_runtime_binding(workspace_id, &unverified.iss)
-        .await
-        .map_err(|error| WorkerMutationSourceProofError::Authority(error.to_string()))?
-        .filter(|record| record.revoked_at.is_none())
-        .ok_or(WorkerMutationSourceProofError::RevokedRuntimeTrust)?;
-    let public_key = trusted.public_key.as_str();
-    let expected = RuntimeRequestSourceExpectation {
-        identity_id: &unverified.iss,
-        audience: audience.as_ref(),
-        workspace_id,
-        worker_id: unverified.worker_id.as_deref(),
-        permission,
-        method,
-        path,
-        body_digest,
-        now_unix: i64::try_from(unix_now_seconds()).unwrap_or(i64::MAX),
 };
-    let claims =
-        verify_runtime_request_source(proof, public_key, &expected).map_err(map_auth_error)?;
-    let now_seconds = u64::try_from(expected.now_unix).unwrap_or(u64::MAX);
-    let expires_at = u64::try_from(claims.exp).unwrap_or(0);
-    let consumed_at = chrono::DateTime::from_timestamp(expected.now_unix, 0)
-        .ok_or(WorkerMutationSourceProofError::Expired)?
-        .to_rfc3339();
-    if !store
-        .consume_worker_mutation_source_jti(
-            workspace_id,
-            &claims.iss,
-            &claims.jti,
-            expires_at,
-            now_seconds,
-            &consumed_at,
-        )
-        .await
-        .map_err(|error| WorkerMutationSourceProofError::Authority(error.to_string()))?
-    {
-        return Err(WorkerMutationSourceProofError::Replay);
-    }
-    if let Some(worker_id) = claims.worker_id.as_deref() {
-        let worker = worker_runtime::identity::RuntimeWorkerRef {
-            runtime_id: claims.iss.clone(),
-            worker_id: worker_id.to_owned(),
-        };
-        let member = store
-            .get_worker_registry(workspace_id, &worker)
-            .map_err(|error| WorkerMutationSourceProofError::Authority(error.to_string()))?;
-        let reserved = store
-            .has_active_worker_create_reservation(workspace_id, &worker)
-            .map_err(|error| WorkerMutationSourceProofError::Authority(error.to_string()))?;
-        if member.is_none() && !reserved {
-            return Err(WorkerMutationSourceProofError::WorkerCatalogMembership);
-        }
-        store
-            .require_current_worker_singleton_owner(workspace_id, &worker)
-            .map_err(|error| WorkerMutationSourceProofError::Authority(error.to_string()))?;
-    }
-    Ok(VerifiedRuntimeRequestSource {
-        runtime_id: claims.iss,
-        worker_id: claims.worker_id,
-    })
-}
 
 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
 pub enum PresentedWorkerMutationSourceProof<'a> {

crates/workspace-server/src/worker_source/runtime_request.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,248 @@
+use worker_runtime::auth::{
+    RuntimeAuthError, RuntimeRequestClaim, RuntimeRequestSourceClaims,
+    RuntimeRequestSourceExpectation, decode_runtime_request_source_claims,
+    verify_runtime_request_source,
+};
+
+use super::{remote_audience, unix_now_seconds};
+use crate::server::{ServerConfig, WorkspaceApi};
+use crate::store::ControlPlaneStore;
+
+#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
+pub struct VerifiedRuntimeRequestSource {
+    pub runtime_id: String,
+    pub worker_id: Option<String>,
+}
+
+/// Safe diagnostics only: never stores proof, raw claims, keys or store errors.
+/// Verification is progress through proof checks, NOT an authenticated principal.
+#[derive(Clone, Debug, thiserror::Error)]
+#[error("invalid runtime request proof")]
+pub struct RuntimeRequestProofError {
+    pub(crate) reason: &'static str,
+    pub(crate) verification: &'static str,
+    pub(crate) runtime_id_hash: Option<String>,
+    pub(crate) worker_id_hash: Option<String>,
+    pub(crate) token_id_hash: Option<String>,
+    pub(crate) iat: Option<i64>,
+    pub(crate) exp: Option<i64>,
+    pub(crate) now: Option<i64>,
+    pub(crate) time_delta_seconds: Option<u64>,
+}
+
+impl RuntimeRequestProofError {
+    fn undecoded() -> Self {
+        Self {
+            reason: "invalid",
+            verification: "unverified",
+            runtime_id_hash: None,
+            worker_id_hash: None,
+            token_id_hash: None,
+            iat: None,
+            exp: None,
+            now: None,
+            time_delta_seconds: None,
+        }
+    }
+
+    fn decoded(claims: &RuntimeRequestSourceClaims) -> Self {
+        Self {
+            runtime_id_hash: Some(diagnostic_id_hash(&claims.iss)),
+            worker_id_hash: claims.worker_id.as_deref().map(diagnostic_id_hash),
+            token_id_hash: Some(diagnostic_id_hash(&claims.jti)),
+            ..Self::undecoded()
+        }
+    }
+
+    fn reason(mut self, reason: &'static str) -> Self {
+        self.reason = reason;
+        self
+    }
+
+    fn auth_error(mut self, error: RuntimeAuthError) -> Self {
+        self.reason = match error {
+            RuntimeAuthError::InvalidTokenFormat => "invalid_format",
+            RuntimeAuthError::InvalidBase64(_) => "invalid_encoding",
+            RuntimeAuthError::MalformedClaims(_) => "malformed_claims",
+            RuntimeAuthError::InvalidPublicKeyFormat => "invalid_runtime_public_key",
+            RuntimeAuthError::InvalidSignature => "invalid_signature",
+            RuntimeAuthError::ClaimMismatch(claim) => {
+                self.verification = "signature_verified";
+                match claim {
+                    RuntimeRequestClaim::Issuer => "issuer_mismatch",
+                    RuntimeRequestClaim::Audience => "audience_mismatch",
+                    RuntimeRequestClaim::Workspace => "workspace_mismatch",
+                    RuntimeRequestClaim::Worker => "worker_mismatch",
+                    RuntimeRequestClaim::Permission => "permission_mismatch",
+                    RuntimeRequestClaim::Method => "method_mismatch",
+                    RuntimeRequestClaim::Path => "path_mismatch",
+                    RuntimeRequestClaim::BodyDigest => "body_digest_mismatch",
+                }
+            }
+            RuntimeAuthError::RequestIssuedInFuture { iat, exp, now } => {
+                self.time(iat, exp, now, iat.abs_diff(now));
+                "issued_in_future"
+            }
+            RuntimeAuthError::RequestExpired { iat, exp, now } => {
+                self.time(iat, exp, now, now.abs_diff(exp));
+                "expired"
+            }
+            _ => "invalid",
+        };
+        self
+    }
+
+    fn time(&mut self, iat: i64, exp: i64, now: i64, delta: u64) {
+        self.verification = "signature_verified";
+        self.iat = Some(iat);
+        self.exp = Some(exp);
+        self.now = Some(now);
+        self.time_delta_seconds = Some(delta);
+    }
+}
+
+/// Domain-separated fixed-length fingerprints, not raw request-derived IDs.
+/// Operators can correlate a known ID by applying this same function.
+pub fn diagnostic_id_hash(id: &str) -> String {
+    use sha2::{Digest, Sha256};
+    let mut hash = Sha256::new();
+    hash.update(b"yoi-runtime-proof-diagnostic-id-v1\0");
+    hash.update(id.as_bytes());
+    hash.finalize()
+        .iter()
+        .map(|byte| format!("{byte:02x}"))
+        .collect()
+}
+
+#[allow(clippy::too_many_arguments)]
+pub async fn verify_runtime_request_source_proof(
+    api: &WorkspaceApi,
+    proof: &str,
+    workspace_id: &str,
+    permission: &str,
+    method: &str,
+    path: &str,
+    body_digest: &str,
+) -> Result<VerifiedRuntimeRequestSource, RuntimeRequestProofError> {
+    verify_runtime_request_source_proof_with_store(
+        api.store.as_ref(),
+        &api.config,
+        proof,
+        workspace_id,
+        permission,
+        method,
+        path,
+        body_digest,
+    )
+    .await
+}
+
+#[allow(clippy::too_many_arguments)]
+pub async fn verify_runtime_request_source_proof_with_store(
+    store: &dyn ControlPlaneStore,
+    config: &ServerConfig,
+    proof: &str,
+    workspace_id: &str,
+    permission: &str,
+    method: &str,
+    path: &str,
+    body_digest: &str,
+) -> Result<VerifiedRuntimeRequestSource, RuntimeRequestProofError> {
+    let unverified = decode_runtime_request_source_claims(proof)
+        .map_err(|error| RuntimeRequestProofError::undecoded().auth_error(error))?;
+    let diagnostic = RuntimeRequestProofError::decoded(&unverified);
+    let audience = remote_audience(config, workspace_id)
+        .map_err(|_| diagnostic.clone().reason("backend_audience_unavailable"))?;
+    let trusted = store
+        .get_workspace_runtime_binding(workspace_id, &unverified.iss)
+        .await
+        .map_err(|_| {
+            diagnostic
+                .clone()
+                .reason("runtime_trust_authority_unavailable")
+        })?
+        .filter(|record| record.revoked_at.is_none())
+        .ok_or_else(|| {
+            diagnostic
+                .clone()
+                .reason("runtime_trust_missing_or_revoked")
+        })?;
+    let expected = RuntimeRequestSourceExpectation {
+        identity_id: &unverified.iss,
+        audience,
+        workspace_id,
+        worker_id: unverified.worker_id.as_deref(),
+        permission,
+        method,
+        path,
+        body_digest,
+        now_unix: i64::try_from(unix_now_seconds()).unwrap_or(i64::MAX),
+    };
+    let claims =
+        verify_runtime_request_source(proof, &trusted.public_key, &expected).map_err(|error| {
+            // Proof encoding was already decoded successfully. A base64 error
+            // at this stage is in the configured public key, not the proof.
+            let error = match error {
+                RuntimeAuthError::InvalidBase64(_) => RuntimeAuthError::InvalidPublicKeyFormat,
+                other => other,
+            };
+            diagnostic.clone().auth_error(error)
+        })?;
+    let diagnostic = RuntimeRequestProofError {
+        verification: "request_verified",
+        ..diagnostic
+    };
+    let now_seconds = u64::try_from(expected.now_unix).unwrap_or(u64::MAX);
+    let expires_at = u64::try_from(claims.exp).unwrap_or(0);
+    let consumed_at = chrono::DateTime::from_timestamp(expected.now_unix, 0)
+        .ok_or_else(|| diagnostic.clone().reason("verification_time_out_of_range"))?
+        .to_rfc3339();
+    if !store
+        .consume_worker_mutation_source_jti(
+            workspace_id,
+            &claims.iss,
+            &claims.jti,
+            expires_at,
+            now_seconds,
+            &consumed_at,
+        )
+        .await
+        .map_err(|_| diagnostic.clone().reason("replay_authority_unavailable"))?
+    {
+        return Err(diagnostic.reason("replay"));
+    }
+    if let Some(worker_id) = claims.worker_id.as_deref() {
+        let worker = worker_runtime::identity::RuntimeWorkerRef {
+            runtime_id: claims.iss.clone(),
+            worker_id: worker_id.to_owned(),
+        };
+        let member = store
+            .get_worker_registry(workspace_id, &worker)
+            .map_err(|_| {
+                diagnostic
+                    .clone()
+                    .reason("worker_catalog_authority_unavailable")
+            })?;
+        let reserved = store
+            .has_active_worker_create_reservation(workspace_id, &worker)
+            .map_err(|_| {
+                diagnostic
+                    .clone()
+                    .reason("worker_reservation_authority_unavailable")
+            })?;
+        if member.is_none() && !reserved {
+            return Err(diagnostic.reason("worker_catalog_membership"));
+        }
+        store
+            .require_current_worker_singleton_owner(workspace_id, &worker)
+            .map_err(|_| {
+                diagnostic
+                    .clone()
+                    .reason("worker_singleton_authority_denied")
+            })?;
+    }
+    Ok(VerifiedRuntimeRequestSource {
+        runtime_id: claims.iss,
+        worker_id: claims.worker_id,
+    })
+}

docs/development/runtime-request-proof-diagnostics.md

@@ -0,0 +1,83 @@
+# Runtime request proof rejection diagnostics
+
+`runtime_request_proof_rejected` (`yoi::auth`, WARN) is an internal operational
+record. HTTP responses are unchanged: 401 with no proof details (repository
+routes retain their existing generic API error envelope). It does **not** establish
+why the reported same-machine intermittent 401 occurred. No reproduction or
+causal measurement of that incident has been obtained.
+
+## Verification and correlation
+
+- `request_id`: Server-generated UUID identifying this rejection event. It is not
+  a caller-supplied ID or a response header, and is not a cross-service trace ID.
+- `claimed_runtime_id_hash`, `claimed_worker_id_hash`, `claimed_token_id_hash`:
+  lowercase 64-character hex SHA-256 of
+  `b"yoi-runtime-proof-diagnostic-id-v1\0" + id.as_bytes()`.
+  `worker_source::diagnostic_id_hash` exposes this correlation function. Hash a
+  known Runtime/Worker ID to find its failures; token ID hashes correlate replay
+  attempts without logging the proof or JTI itself. These are fingerprints, not
+  encryption: low-entropy IDs can be guessed. Do not place secrets in IDs.
+- All claims-derived fields are prefixed `claimed_`, even after signature checks.
+  `proof_verification` describes check progress, **not an authorized principal**:
+  - `unverified`: decoding may have succeeded, but signature verification has not.
+  - `signature_verified`: signature passed; request binding or time failed.
+  - `request_verified`: signature, request bindings and time passed, but replay,
+    membership or authority failed.
+- When decoding fails, there are no claims fingerprints. Do not infer a Runtime
+  from a malformed proof. No raw claims, proof, key, header, body or raw error is
+  logged. The body digest and claim mismatch values are also deliberately absent.
+- Method, query-free path, and requested workspace are request metadata, not
+  authenticated claims. They are bounded to 32, 512 and 128 UTF-8 bytes, with
+  control characters removed. Truncated paths are not unique identifiers. Query
+  names and values are never included. Paths are operational metadata, not a
+  place to put secrets.
+
+## Reasons and their limits
+
+Decoding distinguishes `invalid_format`, `invalid_encoding`, and
+`malformed_claims`; no parser error text is included. Signature checks distinguish
+`invalid_runtime_public_key` from `invalid_signature` (which cannot tell whether
+an attacker, wrong key, corruption, or configuration mismatch caused the failure).
+
+Request binding reports the first mismatch, in the existing check order:
+`issuer_mismatch`, `audience_mismatch`, `workspace_mismatch`, `worker_mismatch`,
+`permission_mismatch`, `method_mismatch`, `path_mismatch`, `body_digest_mismatch`.
+The server selects the trusted key by the unverified issuer and expects that
+same issuer/worker; issuer and worker mismatches can be diagnosed by the lower
+verifier but are not independently detectable by the current server caller.
+These diagnostics do not add new identity checks or change authorization.
+
+`backend_audience_unavailable` denotes missing Backend public URL configuration.
+`runtime_trust_missing_or_revoked` deliberately covers both absence and revocation,
+as the existing store lookup/filter does not preserve that distinction.
+`replay` means JTI consumption returned false. `worker_catalog_membership` means
+neither registry membership nor an active create reservation was found.
+
+Store failures identify their check stage without exposing raw errors:
+`runtime_trust_authority_unavailable`, `replay_authority_unavailable`,
+`worker_catalog_authority_unavailable`, `worker_reservation_authority_unavailable`,
+`worker_singleton_authority_denied`. The last can represent either an owner
+conflict or an authority failure: the store currently returns a shared error,
+so the diagnostic does not guess which. `verification_time_out_of_range` means
+that conversion to the JTI consumption timestamp failed; it is not proof expiry.
+`invalid` is a fallback for lower verifier errors not classified for this path.
+
+## Time contract and T-728 coordination
+
+This change preserves strict integer-second checks, inclusive bounds, and
+verification order: signature, request binding, then `iat > now`, then `exp < now`.
+No skew tolerance is added. If both time predicates fail, future issuance wins.
+
+- `issued_in_future`: `time_delta_seconds = iat - now` (positive).
+- `expired`: `time_delta_seconds = now - exp` (positive).
+- Only these reasons include `issued_at_unix`, `expires_at_unix`,
+  `verified_at_unix` and `time_tolerance_seconds` (currently zero).
+- Deltas use `i64::abs_diff`, preserving the full positive `u64` range without
+  overflow. All times come from the actual signature-verified rejection and
+  the exact clock sample used for that decision, not a second log-time sample.
+
+T-728 owns any change to tolerance/validity policy. If it changes these checks,
+the error time data, logged effective tolerance, and boundary tests must change
+together. Do not label future issuance as expiry or independently recompute the
+rejection using a different clock sample. This is instrumentation for the next
+incident, not evidence that the original incident has been resolved.

docs/report/t729-restored-base-test-compile-blocker.md

@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+# T-729: restored base test-only compile blocker
+
+The assigned checkout starts at `f9d4c97f` (WIP 0.2 integration). On 2026-10-08,
+`cargo test -p yoi-workspace-server --lib auth_logging_tests` could not compile
+because `server_workspace_config_wip_tests.rs` still calls `WipRuntime::discover`
+(lines 152 and 192), which no longer exists, and external `WipRuntime::call`
+(lines 170 and 200), which is now crate-private. At the initial failure those
+files were unchanged by the T-729 diagnostic work.
+
+A narrow test filter still builds all lib test modules, so it cannot isolate the
+new authentication boundary tests from this unrelated test API mismatch. This
+was escalated on T-729 instead of silently disabling those tests or widening the
+Ticket to migrate unrelated configuration tests. Future API migration work should
+check affected test-only consumers as well as the normal compilation closure.
+
+The additional no-default-features check also fails in unchanged Runtime modules:
+`resource.rs`, `worker_backend.rs` and `worker_source.rs` import feature-gated
+`workspace_request`, `reqwest` and `futures` unconditionally. The no-default lib
+test build additionally calls feature-gated filesystem constructors. This is not
+an auth diagnostic regression and was not repaired by broadening T-729. Default
+Runtime crate tests pass (345 library tests, 17 tests in each of the two binaries);
+root `cargo check` passes. After correcting the T-729 SHA formatting, the Server
+lib test build reports only the four existing WIP API errors above.
+
+## Resolution of the Server prerequisite
+
+Ticket T-729 seq7 explicitly authorized a narrow test-only migration. Commit
+`717ff255` replaces the helpers with public Tree, path-centered Inspect and
+structured InterfaceReference Invoke. All existing Backend authority, attachment,
+mutation, stale observation and unknown-outcome assertions are retained. All 12
+`workspace_config_integration` tests pass, and the authentication logging tests
+now run (3 passed). No production API was exposed or legacy API revived. The
+no-default-features issue remains separate and unresolved.