fix: retain structured Workdir refusal diagnostics across provider boundaries
This commit is contained in:
@@ -0,0 +1,131 @@
|
||||
# Workdir refusal diagnostics
|
||||
|
||||
This change improves the internal `api_error` record for
|
||||
`POST /api/w/{workspace_id}/workers/self/workdir-session/operations`.
|
||||
It does **not** identify or resolve the reported 2026-10-09 403: the running
|
||||
binary revision and actual request are still unverified. Fixture success is
|
||||
not evidence about that incident. No deployment, live asset cleanup, privilege
|
||||
change, retry policy, or WIP dependency/version change is included (WIP remains
|
||||
0.2.0).
|
||||
|
||||
## Diagnostic path and public contract
|
||||
|
||||
Original refusing branches attach a closed `WorkdirDenialReason`, rather than
|
||||
recovering meaning from an error string. `WorkdirError::Denied` carries local
|
||||
message plus optional typed reason. `DenialContext` retains an existing error
|
||||
classification while enriching its diagnostics (notably checkout's historical
|
||||
permission-to-out-of-scope mapping). Typed provider markers survive the
|
||||
`FsAccessPolicy`/`io::Error` → `FsError` → `WorkdirError` boundaries.
|
||||
|
||||
`WorkdirTransportError.denial_reason` and
|
||||
`ExternalWorkdirOperationError.denial_reason` carry only an optional snake-case
|
||||
enum. Remote HTTP and External errors preserve that reason when converted back
|
||||
to `WorkdirError` and then forwarded again. Provider text is not the reason.
|
||||
The External codec continues dropping provider-authored message text. A missing
|
||||
reason stays unknown for generic `denied`; existing code-level path/symlink/
|
||||
read-only classifications can still identify their original category. Unknown
|
||||
or oversized reason strings fail deserialization rather than becoming log data.
|
||||
|
||||
Runtime registry session-open failures now retain a safe transport error **before**
|
||||
the former raw error-to-string conversion. Their existing Workspace HTTP meaning
|
||||
is still 502 (`workdir_session_open_failed`); operation-level permission failures
|
||||
remain 403. Session-open messages are normalized to the same safe provider
|
||||
message vocabulary instead of forwarding raw local errors. No authorization,
|
||||
scope, capability, session ownership, command ownership, or retry conditions
|
||||
are relaxed.
|
||||
|
||||
The self handler attaches internal context to its error. Both the handwritten
|
||||
response adapter and the generated route preserve it through the typed error
|
||||
response extension to `ApiErrorLog` and the logging middleware. Server API
|
||||
`workdir_log` and `denial_reason` are `serde(skip)` and omitted from schemas:
|
||||
the external error envelope remains `{code, message}` for provider failures or
|
||||
the existing Repository-style envelope for API/domain failures. Workspace
|
||||
responses do not expose the new internal diagnostics. Authorized Runtime/provider
|
||||
transport carries the enum to its consumer; it contains no free text or paths.
|
||||
|
||||
## Fields in `yoi::api` / `api_error`
|
||||
|
||||
- `operation`: fixed label from the typed operation (read, read_bytes, write,
|
||||
edit, command_start/status/output/cancel, authorize_scope, scope_rules_overlap,
|
||||
checkout_search/observe/execute, stat/list/glob/grep). No operation Debug dump.
|
||||
- `workdir_stage`: workspace_scope, worker_identity, attachment_validation,
|
||||
session_open, command_lookup, or provider_dispatch. API failures identify the
|
||||
refusing stage without copying raw alias/handle/error text into the log.
|
||||
- `denial_reason`: optional closed reason reported by the provider/error chain.
|
||||
It describes the encountered refusing branch, not a permission grant and not
|
||||
an independent attestation of an external provider's explanation.
|
||||
- `workspace_id_hash`, `runtime_id_hash`, `worker_id_hash`, `workdir_id_hash`,
|
||||
`attachment_alias_hash`: 64-character lowercase SHA-256 fingerprints via
|
||||
`worker_source::diagnostic_id_hash`, using the existing
|
||||
`yoi-runtime-proof-diagnostic-id-v1\0` domain prefix. Hash a known catalog ID
|
||||
or attachment alias to locate its logs. Workspace and alias represent route/
|
||||
request selection; Runtime/Worker are added only after current identity checks,
|
||||
and Workdir only after a validated attachment is found. Missing information is
|
||||
omitted, never inferred from a failed lookup or command handle.
|
||||
- `request_token_id_hash`: fingerprint of the **existing verified Runtime proof
|
||||
JTI**, reusing the T-729 hash algorithm. It is not the proof, raw token ID,
|
||||
caller-supplied trace header, or a newly invented cross-service trace ID.
|
||||
In-process/test callers without that proof correlation omit it. Authentication
|
||||
still consumes the JTI using the existing policy; logging does not retry it.
|
||||
- Existing `method`, query-free `path`, `status`, `kind`, `message`, `diagnostics`
|
||||
remain. Workdir-context method/path are bounded to 32/512 UTF-8 bytes with
|
||||
controls removed. Provider operation messages remain normalized safe text.
|
||||
Contextual API failures use a fixed internal message and status-based kind,
|
||||
with no raw domain diagnostics copied into this log. Empty `diagnostics` does
|
||||
**not** mean the optional typed reason/context is absent.
|
||||
|
||||
Fingerprints are bounded correlation, not encryption: low-entropy identifiers
|
||||
can be guessed. Do not put credentials in IDs. Neither hashes nor stage labels
|
||||
prove the reported incident's cause. The request JTI identifies the incoming
|
||||
request; External operation IDs/generation/audit records remain their existing
|
||||
provider-side mechanisms, not a cross-service trace automatically joined here.
|
||||
|
||||
## Refusal vocabulary and limits
|
||||
|
||||
Reasons distinguish scope resolution/comparison unavailable, attenuated
|
||||
capability refusal, logical/parent/attachment/delegation scope exceeded,
|
||||
empty scope, invalid scoped path, writable-scope requirements for commands,
|
||||
child write-lease conflicts, unreadable cwd, read-only session, external root
|
||||
symlink/change/move, external scope symlink, checkout output-root escape,
|
||||
provider root escape, checkout search/enumeration refusal, provider symlink/
|
||||
checked-target refusal, path out of scope, symlink target out of scope, and
|
||||
read-only path. Original local messages remain local; arbitrary message text
|
||||
is never parsed into a reason.
|
||||
|
||||
- `os_permission_denied`: PermissionDenied with an actual OS error code, without
|
||||
a recognized policy marker. It does not determine whether modes, ACLs,
|
||||
sandboxing, mount policy, or another OS mechanism caused the refusal.
|
||||
- `unclassified_permission_denied`: custom PermissionDenied with neither typed
|
||||
policy origin nor raw OS code. Do not label an arbitrary
|
||||
`Error::new(PermissionDenied, "...")` as an OS refusal by guessing from text.
|
||||
- External/remote providers that do not send a reason cannot supply distinctions
|
||||
erased in their own binary. A registered provider's typed explanation is
|
||||
reported data, not proof of what happened inside that provider.
|
||||
- Authentication/JSON ingress failures before a typed Workdir operation and
|
||||
target can be obtained continue using their existing rejection diagnostics;
|
||||
no operation/body is guessed or decoded from rejected proof data.
|
||||
|
||||
## Regression proof boundaries
|
||||
|
||||
- Workdir provider fixtures exercise actual local authorization, broker scope/
|
||||
capability/read-only/delegation/lease refusals and confinement. Permission
|
||||
fixtures distinguish typed policy origins, OS-coded PermissionDenied, and
|
||||
origin-unknown custom errors, including checkout's existing public mapping.
|
||||
- Loopback HTTP fake exercises remote open/operation decoding and typed reason
|
||||
forwarding, including missing-reason providers and hostile provider text.
|
||||
External JSON/frame codecs exercise the bounded error envelope and reject
|
||||
arbitrary reason strings; the Server's External adapter drives the real self
|
||||
generated route through command-session dispatch and response/log conversion.
|
||||
- Server router tests use signed fixture requests and capture actual tracing
|
||||
events. They cover read/write/command_start/authorize_scope, session-open
|
||||
failures, External command status failures, no-identity rejection, oversized
|
||||
UTF-8 alias, oversized command/file/tool-call inputs, query/header/proof/key/
|
||||
credential markers, and raw provider/host paths. Identity hashes and the
|
||||
existing verified JTI fingerprint are checked against fixture identities.
|
||||
- The Server API boundary proves internal fields are absent from body/schema.
|
||||
Worker HTTP→WIP coverage verifies diagnostic wrappers do not change refusal
|
||||
classification or induce retries; tools retain established checkout codes.
|
||||
|
||||
These are hermetic Rust/API/protocol fixtures, not a full product-process E2E,
|
||||
not a deployed binary test, and not reproduction of the user's asset/request.
|
||||
Validation commands and concrete counts are recorded on the implementation MR.
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user