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yoi/.yoi/tickets/00001KVMG8FTW/thread.md

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作成

LocalTicketBackend によって作成されました。

State changed

Ticket を workspace-panel が queued にしました。

Decision

Routing decision: implementation_ready

Reason:

  • Ticket body は host_api.https 廃止、host_api.request 統一、manifest-declared URL/request target permissions、enablement grant 照合、runtime fail-closed、local/private target 明示 grant、broad/arbitrary URL 表示、docs/tests/diagnostics 更新まで具体化されている。
  • readiness: implementation_ready で、relations / orchestration plan に blocker はない。
  • Current active implementation 00001KVMFFYVX は Workspace web control plane bootstrap で、主対象は backend/frontend/store/Nix packaging。This Ticket の主対象は plugin manifest/pod runtime/plugin CLI/docs/tests で直接の semantic blocker はない。過去のユーザー指示「blocker無いなら並列に」に従い、並列実装可能と判断する。
  • Orchestrator worktree is clean on orchestration at f164483e で、対象 Ticket 用 worktree / branch は未作成。
  • Visible Pods に対象 Ticket の child Pod は存在しない。

Evidence checked:

  • Ticket body / thread / artifacts via TicketShow and direct item.md read。
  • TicketRelationQuery(00001KVMG8FTW): no relations / blockers。
  • TicketOrchestrationPlanQuery(00001KVMG8FTW): no records。
  • ListPods: active child is only yoi-coder-00001KVMFFYVX; no child for this Ticket。
  • Orchestrator git state / worktree list / branch list checked from /home/hare/Projects/yoi/.worktree/orchestration only。
  • Bounded code map:
    • crates/manifest/src/plugin.rs: PluginGrantConfig.https, PluginHttpsGrant, PluginHostApi::Https, permission/grant resolution/tests。
    • crates/pod/src/feature/plugin.rs: PluginHttps* runtime request path, yoi:host/https@1.0.0 / raw wasm yoi:https imports, URL validation, request bounds, credential header checks, public-IP guard, allowlist checks, plugin tests。
    • crates/yoi/src/plugin_cli.rs: inspection formatting for configured HTTPS grants。
    • docs/development/plugin-development.md: active host_api.https / grants.https docs。

IntentPacket:

Intent:

  • Replace public/model/config-facing host_api.https with URL-permission based one-shot host_api.request.
  • Keep existing safe outbound request behavior where applicable, but generalize schemes/targets so explicit manifest + enablement grants can authorize loopback/private/local targets.
  • Keep WebSocket / SSE / persistent connections out of request.

Binding decisions / invariants:

  • Do not add backward compatibility aliases for host_api.https, PluginHttps*, or grants.https in active APIs unless explicitly escalated and reapproved。
  • Model/config-facing naming must be request; internal names should also avoid PluginHttps* unless truly private transitional code is justified and not exposed。
  • Runtime authorization requires both manifest-declared request target permission and enablement grant for that target。
  • Grant-only without manifest request must fail closed or be explicitly diagnosed as unsafe/unused override; do not silently expand authority。
  • Requested-but-ungranted target must fail closed before network I/O。
  • Localhost/loopback/private/local targets are not ambient; they require manifest declaration and enablement grant。
  • Arbitrary URL / broad network access must be visibly distinguished from normal target grants in inspection/diagnostics。
  • Embedded credentials, credential-like headers, request/response bounds, external-content untrusted treatment, and no hidden context injection remain mandatory。
  • WebSocket URL / upgrade / persistent stream must be rejected or explicitly unsupported by request。
  • Existing HTTPS request use cases must continue under host_api.request with explicit request permission/grant。

Requirements / acceptance criteria:

  • Active API naming uses host_api.request / request grant naming。
  • Plugin manifest statically declares request target permissions readable from manifest alone。
  • Enablement config grants request targets and is matched against manifest-declared targets。
  • Runtime checks method/scheme/host/port/path prefix against declared+granted URL permission。
  • http://localhost / loopback request can be allowed only with explicit declaration+grant。
  • Existing public HTTPS use case works as request。
  • Broad/arbitrary URL is supported only with clear broad display/diagnostic if implemented。
  • yoi plugin show / static inspection distinguishes requested, granted, denied/missing, and broad request permissions。
  • Docs/templates/tests/diagnostics are updated to request naming and WebSocket separate-capability policy。

Implementation latitude:

  • Exact Rust/TOML type names are up to Coder, but active names should be request-oriented, e.g. PluginRequestGrant, PluginRequestTarget, host_api.request.
  • Regex support is optional. If added, it must include review-readable normalized display/warning/label and tests for broad/opaque handling。
  • Request target schema may start with exact scheme/host/optional port/method/path prefix. Keep permission review human-readable。
  • Internal runtime can reuse/refactor existing HTTPS client/request code, but reviewer should see active API renaming and policy changes。
  • Raw wasm/component import migration may choose new import names with tests; if keeping an internal compatibility import is unavoidable, escalate before committing.

Escalate if:

  • Compatibility alias for old host_api.https / grants.https seems required。
  • Local/private target policy would open without both manifest declaration and grant。
  • Arbitrary URL access becomes visually indistinguishable from normal grants。
  • WebSocket/SSE/daemon lifecycle begins to enter request。
  • Secret-bearing headers/env/config would flow from guest memory without explicit SecretRef/grant design。
  • Regex support becomes opaque or hard to review。
  • Parallel active 00001KVMFFYVX work creates unavoidable Cargo.lock / package.nix conflict; report rather than broad-rebasing alone。

Validation plan:

  • cargo fmt --check
  • Focused manifest plugin tests for request permission parsing/resolution and naming removal。
  • Focused pod plugin tests for grant allow/deny, requested-but-ungranted, granted-but-unrequested, loopback/local allow/deny, WebSocket/upgrade rejection, request/response bounds/credential-header safety。
  • Focused yoi plugin CLI tests for request permission/grant/broad/missing diagnostics。
  • Docs/template grep ensuring active host_api.https / grants.https / PluginHttps* naming is removed except historical Ticket text or explicitly justified migration notes。
  • cargo check for affected crates, git diff --check, yoi ticket doctor。

Reviewer focus:

  • Breaking-change intent is real: no stale active docs/templates/CLI inspection still teaching host_api.https。
  • Authorization must be two-stage: manifest request + grant。
  • Local/private network must not become ambient。
  • Old public HTTPS use case must still work under request naming。
  • External content and hidden context constraints remain intact。

State changed

Human authorized queue routing from Workspace Dashboard. Ticket has concrete acceptance criteria and no recorded blockers; active Workspace web control plane implementation is semantically separate enough for parallel implementation. Orchestrator accepts this Plugin host API refactor into implementation.