yoi/.yoi/objectives/00001KTR80WMN/item.md

title	state	created_at	updated_at	linked_tickets
MCP local stdio integration roadmap	active	2026-06-10T07:48:45Z	2026-06-20T05:34:00Z	00001KTR81P9X 00001KV0SP0TY 00001KVHR3WRF 00001KVHR3WRY 00001KVHR3WS6 00001KVHR3WSD 00001KVHR3WSN 00001KVHR3WSW

Objective

Add MCP local stdio integration to Yoi without weakening Worker history, prompt-context, scoped tool permission, or Plugin/Feature layering invariants.

MCP is a protocol-backed integration layer on top of pod::feature. pod::feature supplies contribution/lifecycle/dynamic registration substrate; MCP owns its own enablement, local server trust model, command/env/secret policy, and MCP-specific permission decisions. MCP is not the Plugin model, and Plugin permission policy is not implemented by feature-layer authority grants.

Strategic direction

• Baseline the initial implementation on MCP specification 2025-11-25.
• Start with local stdio MCP servers only.
• Treat MCP server metadata, tools, resources, prompts, and results as untrusted content.
• Do not allow MCP resources/prompts to become hidden context injection.
  • They must be explicit tool operations with history records.
• Use the normal Yoi ToolRegistry, PreToolCall permission, history, and bounded result paths.
• Do not add private MCP-only bypasses around Worker/tool invariants.
• Keep sampling and elicitation fail-closed initially.
• Keep Streamable HTTP, remote auth, OAuth, and MCP Registry/distribution out of the first slice.
• Treat local stdio server execution as an explicit MCP config/trust decision, not as a pod::feature authority grant.
• Document clearly that a configured local MCP server runs as a local executable; Yoi feature authority does not sandbox its OS-level side effects.

Layering decisions

• pod::feature is an API/contribution substrate.
  • It owns contribution declarations, provider/service lifecycle hooks, diagnostics, dynamic registration plumbing, and integration with normal Worker/ToolRegistry paths.
  • It does not own Plugin permission policy or MCP server trust policy.
• Plugin is a user-facing package/config/runtime layer over pod::feature.
  • Plugin permissions are Plugin-layer policy.
  • Plugin package discovery/enablement must not be conflated with MCP local server execution.
• MCP is a separate feature-backed integration layer.
  • MCP enablement, command/env/secret handling, server trust, and MCP-specific permission decisions live in MCP config/implementation.
  • MCP dynamic tools/resources/prompts are exposed through the feature API and ordinary Yoi tool paths.

Concrete implementation tickets

Completed prerequisites:

• 00001KTR81P9X — Extend pod::feature API for external protocol-backed capability providers.
• 00001KV0SP0TY — Remove feature-layer HostAuthority model.

Concrete MCP implementation sequence:

1. 00001KVHR3WRF — MCP local stdio server config and trust policy.
   • explicit config, command/env/secret redaction, local executable trust boundary, no auto-start.
2. 00001KVHR3WRY — MCP stdio JSON-RPC lifecycle client.
   • subprocess lifecycle, initialize/capability negotiation, diagnostics, shutdown.
3. 00001KVHR3WS6 — MCP tools/list registration into ToolRegistry.
   • stable namespacing, schema validation, untrusted metadata normalization, no tools/call yet.
4. 00001KVHR3WSD — MCP tools/call execution through ordinary Tool path.
   • PreToolCall gate before server call, bounded result serialization, history path.
5. 00001KVHR3WSN — MCP resources/prompts as explicit tool operations.
   • resources/list/read and prompts/list/get without hidden context injection.
6. 00001KVHR3WSW — MCP list_changed notification handling.
   • deterministic safe refresh/diagnostic behavior without breaking tool schema or prompt-cache invariants.

The old broad implementation Ticket 00001KTR82RB7 is superseded by this sequence and should not be used as an implementation work item.

Later follow-ups

• Richer MCP task/task-support integration if ordinary tool-call fallback is insufficient.
• Streamable HTTP transport.
• OAuth / remote auth.
• Registry/package distribution.
• Explicit MCP/Plugin bridge only if separately approved; do not conflate Plugin packages with MCP local server execution.

Success criteria

• A local mock MCP server can be configured explicitly and initialized.
• Discovered MCP tools appear as ordinary Yoi tools with stable namespacing.
• Tool calls go through ordinary permission and history paths.
• MCP resources/prompts are explicit operations, not hidden context injections.
• MCP result forms are bounded and safely serialized.
• Secret values, command/env details, and server diagnostics are redacted where required.
• Local server trust boundary is documented: Yoi does not sandbox the configured executable through feature authority.
• Feature, Plugin, and MCP permission/trust responsibilities are documented as separate layers.